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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Juan A. Jimenez appeals from the district court's orders denying his
request for DNA testing and summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction
relief.

Statement of Facts and Course of Underlying Criminal Proceedings
In the underlying criminal case, the state charged Jimenez with
aggravated battery in relation to the September 9, 2007 stabbing of Jay Voshall.
(R., Vol. 3, pp.424-25.)

The evidence at trial showed Jimenez and Ruben

Nungary got into a physical confrontation with Mr. Voshall inside a Maverick
convenience store. (Trial Tr., 1 p.144, L.7 - p.148, L.22, p.164, Ls.10-25, p.178,
L.10 - p.180, L.11, p.197, L.20 - p.202, L.17, p.269, L.21 - p.270, L.13, p.442,
L.18 - p.449, L.3.) Nungary and Mr. Voshall got into a fistfight. (Trial Tr., p.146,
L.23 - p.147, L.9, p.199, L.10 - p.201, L.5, p.264, Ls.33-12, p.269, Ls.12-25,
p.446, L.23 - p.447, L.12.)

Then, according to witness accounts, 2 Jimenez

shoved Mr. Voshail in the stomach area with one hand, causing Mr. Voshall to
double-over. (Trial Tr., p.147, L.16 - p.148, L.6, p.158, Ls.10-17, p.183, L.17 p.184, L.13, p.201, L.8 - p.202, L.9, p.470, L.25 - p.471, L.6; see also Trial Tr.,

1

The district court took judicial notice of a number of documents from the
underlying criminal case, including the transcript of Jimenez's criminal trial (Trial
Tr.). (See R., Vol. 3, pp.437-38.) That transcript is included in Volume 2 of the
clerk's record at pp.116-273.
2

Mr. Voshall did not appear as a witness at Jimenez's trial.
pp.120-21.)

1

(See R., Vol. 2,

p.270, Ls.4-9 (witness testifying that store surveillance video showed Jimenez
"lean in towards" Mr. Voshall, "almost with one arm like this towards him,"
"[a]lmost like he was giving him a one-arm hug.").)

Jimenez and Nungary then

exited the store. (Trial Tr., p.148, Ls.7-13, p.187, L.9- p.189, L.19, p.201, Ls.816, p.270, Ls.1-13.)
As soon as Jimenez and Nungary left the store, Mr. Voshall lifted up his
shirt and told onlookers he had been "stabbed" or "shanked " (Trial Tr., p.148,
Ls.10-16, p.180, Ls.8-11.) He was bleeding from his abdomen, and there was
blood on the floor.

(Trial Tr., p.148, Ls.17-19, p.155, Ls.6-9, p.181, Ls.7-9,

p.182, Ls.8-11, p.202, Ls.12-21, p.253, L.14 -

p.254, L.2.)

Paramedics

responded to the scene and transported Mr. Voshall to the hospital for treatment
of a one- to one-and-a-half-inch, "straight edged," "slightly gaping" epigastric
wound.

(Trial Tr., p.275, L.13 - p.276, L.20, p.281, L.19 - p.282, L.1, p.283,

L.17 - p.284, L.2.)
In the meantime, police located Jimenez and Nungary and placed them
under arrest. (Trial Tr., p.288, L.1 - p.291, L.23, p.294, Ls.2-7, p.302, L.20 p.304, L.10, p.305, L.14- p.306, L.7.) Jimenez had red stains on the tops of his
shoes, which later tested positive for human blood.

(Trial Tr., p.307, L.22 -

p.308, L.17, p.343, L.22 - p.344, L.10, p.347, L.1 - p.362, L.13, p.423, L.1 p.426, L.7.) Police also canvassed the route Jimenez and Nungary took after
leaving the convenience store and found along that route a knife with red stains
on the blade

(Trial Tr., p.328, L.3 - p.329, L.12, p.362, L.16 - p.367, L.24,
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p.369, L.15 - p.376, L.22); those stains also tested positive for human blood
(Trial Tr., p.417, L.15-p.419, L.6).
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Jimenez guilty of aggravated
battery. (R., Vol. 2, p.291.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of 15
years, with nine years fixed. (R., Vol. 3, pp.435-36.) Jimenez's conviction and
sentence were affirmed on appeal. State v. Jimenez, Docket No. 35807, 2010
Unpublished Opinion No. 305 (Idaho App. Jan. 8, 2010).

Statement of Facts and Course of Post-Conviction Proceedings
Jimenez filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief and
supporting materials.

(R., Vol. 1, pp.4-84.) With the assistance of appointed

counsel, he filed an amended petition and a supporting affidavit.

(R., Vol. 3,

pp.360-68.) Relevant to this appeal, the amended petition alleged trial counsel
was ineffective for: (1) "Refus[ing] to consider DNA test on shoes when asked by
client" (R., Vol. 3, p.362, ,I (9)(b)(viii)); (2) failing to "object to, or attempt in any
way to exclude, blood test evidence" (id., ,-i (9)(c)(iii)); (3) failing to "adequately
show the DVDNideo evidence to client before trial" and otherwise failing to
"prepare client for cross-examination" (id.,

,m (9)(b)(iii) and (9)(c)(ii)); and (4)

failing to "request a lesser-included instruction or verdict form for Simple Battery"
(id., ,I (9)(c)(iv)). Jimenez also filed a motion and affidavit seeking DNA testing of
the blood on Jimenez's shoes and Mr. Voshall's shirt, swabs of which Jimenez
alleged were still in the state's possession. (R., Vol. 3, pp.384-89.)
The state answered the amended petition and also filed an objection to
Jimenez's motion for DNA testing. (R., Vol. 3, pp.376-80, 390-91.) Following a

3

hearing, the district court denied the motion for DNA testing, concluding the
request did not meet the specific requirements of I.C. § 19-4902(b), (c). (R., Vol.
3, pp.392-96; see also 9/19/11 Tr., pp.1-15.)

The state thereafter moved to

dismiss the amended petition in its entirety. (R., Vol. 3, pp.400-36.) Following a
hearing, the district court granted the state's motion and entered an order of
dismissal. (R., Vol. 3, pp.447-86; see also 12/9/11 Tr., pp.5-25.) Jimenez timely
appealed. (R., Vol. 3, pp.488-91.)

4

ISSUES

Jimenez states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Jimenez's motion for
DNA testing?

2.

Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr.
Jimenez's petition for post-conviction relief?

(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Jimenez challenges the denial of his motion for DNA testing but
represents on appeal that, after the district court denied his motion, he
"was able to secure" the DNA testing in a different forum. (Appellant's
brief, p.11 n.4.) Is Jimenez's claim of error moot because the DNA testing
he requested has already been done?

2.

Has Jimenez failed to establish the district court erred in summarily
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
Jimenez's Challenge To The Denial Of His Motion For DNA Testing Is Moot
In the underlying criminal case, the state presented evidence that red
stains on the tops of Jimenez's shoes tested positive for human blood. (Trial Tr.,
p.422, L.14 - p.426, L.7.) Neither the state nor Jimenez conducted DNA testing
on the blood stains, although the technology was available at the time. (Trial Tr.,
p.430, L.11 - p.434, L.15.)

In closing argument, the prosecutor relied on the

blood stains as circumstantial evidence of Jimenez's guilt, arguing to the jury it
was reasonable to infer that the blood on Jimenez's shoes was the victim's.
3

(4/16/08 Tr., p.12, L.19- p.13, L.3, p.14, L.25- p.16, L.5.)
In an affidavit submitted in support of his post-conviction petition, Jimenez
claimed to have told his trial attorney that "the blood on [his] shoe was there
before the night the victim was stabbed" and did not belong to the victim. (R.,
Vol. 1, pp.13-14; see also R., Vol. 1, p.53 (notarized statement of Xavier
Machuca representing he fought with Jimenez earlier in the day and the blood on
Jimenez's shoes was his).)

In his amended post-conviction petition and

supporting affidavit, Jimenez alleged trial counsel was ineffective for refusing his
requests to seek DNA testing of the blood on his shoes.

(R., Vol. 3, pp.362,

366.) He also filed a separate motion for DNA testing of both the blood on his
shoes and the blood on the victim's shirt, contending "[t]he results of said testing

3

The transcript of the parties' closing arguments, referred to herein as "4/16/08
Tr.," is included in Volume 2 of the clerk's record at pp.275-303.
6

[would] produce new, noncumulative evidence that may tend to show that
[Jimenez] is not the person who committed the offense." (R., Vol. 3, pp.384-89.)
The district court denied Jimenez's motion for DNA testing, concluding
that, to be entitled to such testing in a post-conviction proceeding, Jimenez was
required to satisfy the specific requirements of I.C. § 19-4902(b) and (c),
including by showing that the testing sought was not available at the time of trial.
(9/19/11 Tr., p.12, L.16 - p.15, L.11; R., Vol. 3, pp.395-96.)
dismissed

Jimenez's ineffective assistance of counsel

The court also

claim,

concluding

counsel's decision to not seek DNA testing was a matter of trial strategy and,
even if counsel had obtained DNA testing of the blood on Jimenez's shoes and
the results of that testing had excluded the victim as being the source of the
blood, such results could not exclude Jimenez as being the perpetrator of the
crime. (R., Vol. 3, pp.459-60, 480.)
Jimenez argues on appeal that the district court erred in denying his
motion for DNA testing. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-13.) Specifically, he contends
the district court applied an incorrect legal standard when it concluded Jimenez
was required to satisfy the criteria of I. C. § 19-4902, rather than treating
Jimenez's motion as a request for discovery to support his ineffective assistance
of counsel claim. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-13.) Whether the district court did or
did not apply a correct legal standard in denying Jimenez's motion for DNA
testing is a moot issue, however, because according to Jimenez's own
representations, he has since obtained DNA testing of both his shoes and the
victim's shirt, albeit in a different forum. (See Appellant's brief, p.11 n.4 (noting

7

that, after the district court denied his motion, "Jimenez was able to secure
testing of the shoes and Mr. Voshall's shirt in defending a federal criminal action
in which this case was alleged as a predicate act").)
"An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial
controversy that is capable of being concluded by judicial relief."

State v.

Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010) (citations omitted). Even if
true, Jimenez's claim that the district court erred in denying his motion for DNA
testing of the blood on his shoes and the victim's shirt no longer "present[s] a
real and substantial controversy that is capable of being concluded by judicial
relief," id., because Jimenez has, by his own admission, already obtained the
only relief to which he was theoretically entitled pursuant to that motion - i.e.,
DNA testing of the blood on his shoes and the victim's shirt. Because Jimenez
has already secured the DNA testing he requested in his motion, any opinion
from this Court regarding the correctness of the district court's order denying
Jimenez's motion for DNA testing "would simply create precedent for future
cases and would have no effect on either party."

Id.

The issue is therefore

moot, and this Court must decline to consider it. 4

4

For the reasons set forth in Section 11.C.1, infra, the state asserts the district
court did not err in summarily dismissing Jimenez's claim that trial counsel was
ineffective for not obtaining DNA testing of the blood on Jimenez's shoes. Even
if this Court disagrees, Jimenez's remedy is not to have the blood that has
already been tested (apparently by the FBI laboratory (see Appellant's brief, p.11
n.4)) retested; it is to have the case remanded for reconsideration of his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in light of the newly secured DNA
evidence.
8

11.
Jimenez Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Petition
For Post-Conviction Relief
A.

Introduction
Jimenez challenges the summary dismissal of his amended post-

conviction petition, arguing he presented issues of material fact entitling him to
an evidentiary hearing on several of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
(Appellant's brief, pp.13-21.) Jimenez's arguments fail. A review of the record
and the applicable law supports the district court's determination that Jimenez
failed to allege facts and present evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie
case as to any of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the

appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App.
1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280
(Ct. App. 1986).

9

D.

Jimenez Failed To Present A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Entitling Him
To An Evidentiary Hearing On Any Of His Ineffective Assistance Of
Counsel Claims
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for

post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own
initiative.

"To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must

present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject
to summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence
raises no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of petitioner's
claims. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007) (citing
I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court
must accept a petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required
to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by
admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho
at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110,
112 (2001 )). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to
relief, the trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to
dismissing the petition. l5;l (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d
1216, 1220 (1990)).
As is relevant to this appeal, Jimenez's amended petition alleged that trial
counsel was ineffective for: (1) "Refus[ing] to consider DNA test on shoes when

10

asked by client" (R., Vol. 3, p.362, ,I (9)(b)(viii)); (2) failing to "object to, or
attempt in any way to exclude, blood test evidence" (id., ,I (9)(c)(iii)); (3) failing to
"adequately show the DVDNideo evidence to client before trial" and otherwise
failing to "prepare client for cross-examination" (id., 1-r,I (9)(b)(iii) and (9)(c)(ii));
and (4) failing to "request a lesser-included instruction or verdict form for Simple
Battery" (id., ,I (9)(c)(iv)).

To overcome summary dismissal of these claims,

Jimenez was required to demonstrate that "(1) a material issue of fact exist[ed]
as to whether counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) a material issue of
fact exist[edJ as to whether the deficiency prejudiced [Jimenez's] case." Baldwin
v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-54, 177 P.3d 362, 367-68 (2008) (internal citations
omitted); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (a
petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must show both deficient
performance and resulting prejudice).
To establish deficient performance, the burden was on Jimenez "to show
that his attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
This objective standard embraces a strong presumption that trial counsel was
competent and diligent." !,g. "[S]trategic or tactical decisions will not be secondguessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation,
ignorance of relevant
evaluation."

kl

law,

or other shortcomings capable of objective

To establish prejudice, Jimenez was required to show "a

reasonable probability that but for his attorney's deficient performance the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different."

11

kl

Application of the foregoing legal principles to the facts of this case
supports the district court's order of summary dismissal; Jimenez failed to
demonstrate from his pleadings and evidence that a genuine issue of material
fact existed as to either the deficient performance or prejudice prongs of his
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

1.

Jimenez Failed To Present An Issue Of Material Fact Entitling Him
To An Evidentiary Hearing On His Claim That Trial Counsel Was
Ineffective For Not Seeking DNA Testing Of The Blood On
Jimenez's Shoes

Jimenez alleged trial counsel was ineffective for not seeking DNA testing
of the blood on Jimenez's shoes, despite Jimenez's requests that he do so. (R.,
Vol. 3, p.362, ,T9(b)(viii).) In support of this claim, Jimenez asserted he told his
attorney that the blood on his shoes did not belong to the victim, but instead
belonged to Xavier Machuca, an individual with whom Jimenez claimed to have
been in a fight on the same day the victim in this case was stabbed. (R., Vol. 1,
pp.13-14, 53; R., Vol. 3, p.366, ,I9.) According to Jimenez, trial counsel did not
follow up on this information, either by interviewing Machuca or by seeking DNA
testing of the blood on Jimenez's shoes. (R., Vol. 3, p.366, ,I,I9, 10.) Jimenez,
however, did not claim he was prejudiced by counsel's alleged deficiencies.
(See generally, R, Vol. 3, pp.360-68, 439-44.)
The district court summarily dismissed Jimenez's claim that trial counsel
was ineffective for not seeking DNA testing of the blood on Jimenez's shoes,
concluding Jimenez failed to allege facts that, if true, would establish either the
deficient performance or prejudice prongs of his claim. (R., Vol. 3, pp.480-81.)

12

Specifically, with regard to the alleged deficiency, the court found Jimenez failed
to allege facts to overcome the presumption that trial counsel's decision not to
seek DNA testing to discover the source of the blood on Jimenez's shoes was
anything other than sound trial strategy:
It has been this Court's experience that competent defense
counsel does not seek to improve the state's case for the
prosecutor. Rather, defense counsel commonly spend much time
cross-examining the state's witnesses about all of the available
scientific testing and avenues of investigation that the state has not
done or failed to explore; which is what Mr. Porter did in the instant
case.
DNA testing which could exclude [Jimenez as the
perpetrator of the crime] would, of course, be a very appropriate
matter for counsel to explore. That, however, is not the situation in
this case.
(R., Vol. 3, p.481 (emphasis original).) Regarding prejudice, the court "discussed
at length that DNA testing of the blood on the shoes could not exclude [Jimenez]
as being the perpetrator of the crime" (R., Vol. 3, p.480), explaining:
DNA testing has proven to be [a] valuable tool in excluding a
particular person as the perpetrator of an offense in certain
situations. Such testing is often used in sex offense cases and
homicide cases where there is bodily fluid or hair on the body of the
victim or at the scene of the crime. DNA testing can, beyond any
reasonable doubt, exclude a person as being the source of the
bodily fluid or hair. In this case, however, [Jimenez's] argument is
that the blood spots on his shoes belonged to Mr. Machuca with
whom he had been in a fight earlier in the day, prior to the events
resultihg in the crime charged in the underlying criminal case. DNA
testing could not exclude [Jimenez] as the perpetrator of the crime
charged. At best, such DNA testing would exclude the victim as
being the source of the blood spots on [Jimenez's] shoes ....
(R., Vol. 3, p.460.) Because the facts alleged by Jimenez, even if true, would not
have demonstrated Jimenez was not the person who stabbed Mr. Voshall, the
court found Jimenez "failed to make a prima facie case that there is a reasonable

13

probability that the results of DNA testing would have changed the results of the
trial." (R., Vol. 3, pp.459-60.)
Jimenez challenges the district court's ruling, arguing trial counsel had a
duty to investigate the blood evidence relied on by the prosecution and that his
failure to have DNA testing conducted on the shoes "was objectively
unreasonable" because "it allowed the State to infer that the blood - which in
reality was irrelevant - was a key piece of the circumstantial evidence supporting
Mr. Jimenez's guilt."

(Appellant's brief, p.15.)

He also contends he "was

prejudiced by counsel's failure to request the DNA testing," asserting that, but for
the state's ability in closing argument "to infer Mr. Voshall's blood was on Mr.
Jimenez's shoes, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial
would have been different."

(Appellant's brief, p.17.)

Neither of Jimenez's

claims have merit.
While it is well settled that "counsel has a duty to make reasonable
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular
investigations unnecessary," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, it is equally well settled
that, "[iJn any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must
be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a
heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments,"

kl (emphasis

added). "In

assessing the reasonableness of counsel's investigation, [the reviewing court]
consider[s] not only the quantum of evidence known to counsel, but also whether
the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further."
Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 146, 139 P.3d 741, 748 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing
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Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 527 (2003); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691; State v.
Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 307, 986 P.2d 323, 330 (1999)).

Unless counsel's

decision to forego any particular line of investigation is itself based on
"inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings
capable of objective evaluation," such decision may not be second-guessed.
Murphy, 143 Idaho at 145-46, 139 P.3d at 747-48; see also Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 690-91 ("strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts
relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable")
Jimenez failed in his post-conviction petition and supporting materials to
make a prima facie showing that counsel's decision to forego DNA testing of the
blood on Jimenez's shoes was based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of
the law, or any other objective shortcoming. Nor does he identify any objective
shortcoming on appeal. (See Appellant's brief, pp.15-17.) Even accepting as
true Jimenez's assertion that he told trial counsel the blood on his shoes came
from a fight with Mr. Machuca and not from the victim, Jimenez failed to present
any evidence to demonstrate that it was unreasonable not to secure DNA
testing, particularly in light of the other "known evidence" in the case. Murphy,
143 Idaho at 146, 139 P.3d at 748 (citations omitted).
The state's evidence showed only that the blood on Jimenez's shoes was
human blood (Trial Tr., p.423, L.1 - p.426, L.7); the state did not conduct any
DNA testing on the blood and, therefore, could not identify with any degree of
certainty the person to whom the blood belonged (Trial Tr., p.432, L.11 - p.434,
L.15). Although, in hindsight, it appears that DNA testing would have excluded
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Mr. Voshall as the source of the blood on the shoes (see Appellant's brief, p.11
n.4 5), it would have at best been a risky proposition for trial counsel to have
sought DNA testing before trial without knowing for certain what the results of
that testing would be. Such risk would not necessarily have been worth taking
because, as explained be the trial court, even if DNA testing could exclude Mr.
Vosha!I as the source of the blood on Jimenez's shoes, such would not establish
that Jimenez was not the person who stabbed Mr. Voshall; it would only
establish that Mr. Voshall did not bleed on Jimenez's shoes.

Given the risks

associated with the proposed DNA testing, and considering the de minimus
exculpatory value of even a result excluding Mr. Voshall as the source of the
blood, it was not unreasonable for trial counsel to forego DNA testing and focus
instead on exploiting the weaknesses in the state's case (see Trial Tr., p.432,
L.16 - p.434, L.15 (eliciting from the state's criminalist on cross-examination that
state's test showed stains on shoes and knife were human blood and that,
although such tests were available, state did not perform any tests to determine
whose blood was on shoes and knife); 4/16/08 Tr., p.26, L.1 - p.27, L.1
(emphasizing in closing argument that state could have done DNA testing but did
not and, as such, there was no evidence tying the blood on Jimenez's shoes to
the victim)). See Harrington v. Richter,_ U.S._, 131 S.Ct 770, 789 (2011)

5

It is telling that Jimenez has apparently never asked for or secured DNA testing
of the blood on the knife. (Compare R., Vol. 3, pp.384-89 (motion and affidavit
requesting DNA testing of shoes and victim's shirt) and Appellant's brief, p.11 n.4
(indicating Jimenez "was able to secure testing of the shoes and Mr. Voshall's
shirt" in a separate criminal action) with (Trial Tr., p.417, L.15- p.419, L.6 (stains
on knife tested positive for human blood).) Avoiding testing of the knife may also
have played a role in counsel's tactical choice to not seek testing of the shoes.
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(internal quotes omitted) ("Rare are the situations in which the wide latitude
counsel must have in making tactical decisions will be limited to any one
technique or approach.").
Even assuming some objective deficiency in trial counsel's failure to seek
DNA testing, Jimenez failed to make a prima facie showing that he was
prejudiced by that decision. As noted above, the district court found Jimenez
was not prejudiced because, even assuming DNA testing would have excluded
the victim as being the source of the blood on Jimenez's shoes, such evidence
would not have excluded Jimenez as being the perpetrator of the crime. (R., Vol.
3, pp.459-60, 480-81.) That the prosecutor was able, in the absence of a DNA

result to the contrary, to rely on the blood stains on Jimenez's shoes as
circumstantial evidence of his guilt does not, as suggested by Jimenez on appeal
(Appellant's brief, p.17), alter the correctness of the district court's ruling.
Jimenez's trial counsel thoroughly cross-examined the state's criminalist
regarding the failure of the state to have conducted DNA testing on the shoes,
despite the availability of such test, and elicited from her unequivocal testimony
that, in the absence of such test, there was no way to tie the blood stains on the
shoes to the victim.
emphasized

these

(Trial Tr., p.430, L.11 - p.434, L.15.)
facts

in

closing

argument,

thereby

Counsel also

undercutting

the

significance of the evidence and the state's reliance on it. (4/16/08 Tr., p.26, L.1
- p.27, L.1.) These details of the trial go unmentioned by Jimenez on appeal, as
does the fact that the blood on Jimenez's shoes was only one of many pieces of
evidence the state relied on to prove Jimenez was the person who stabbed Mr.
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Voshall. Other evidence presented and relied on included: (1) the testimony of
witnesses who saw Jimenez "shove" Mr. Voshall in the abdomen and then,
almost immediately thereafter, heard Mr. Voshall declare he had been stabbed
and saw blood coming from his abdomen (see Trial Tr., p.147, L.16 - p.148,
L.19, p.158, Ls.10-17, p.180, Ls.8-11, p.181, Ls.7-9, p.183, L.17 - p.184, L.13,
p.201, L.8 - p.202, L.21 ); (2) a surveillance video that showed Jimenez "lean in
towards" Mr. Voshall, "almost like he was giving him a one-arm hug" and then
leave the store with one hand in his pocket (see Trial Tr., p.270, Ls.4-9, p.463,
Ls.1-11); (3) the same surveillance video that showed Mr. Voshall double-over
after Jimenez came towards him (see Trial Tr., p.470, L.8 - p.471, L.1 O); (4)
photographs and witness accounts establishing there was blood on the floor very
near the place Jimenez "shoved" Mr. Voshall (see Trial Tr., p.155, Ls.6-13,
p.182, Ls.8-14, p.193, L.16 - p.196, L.2); and (5) a bloody knife recovered from
the route Jimenez and Ruben Nungary took after leaving the store (Trial Tr.,
p.328, L.3 - p.329, L.12, p.362, L.16 - p.367, L.24, p.369, L. 15 - p.376, L.22,
p.417, L.15 - p.419, L.6). Given the strength of this evidence, and considering
that even a DNA result excluding Mr. Voshall as the source of blood on
Jimenez's shoes would not have demonstrated Jimenez was not the person who
stabbed him, there is no reasonable possibility that DNA testing, had it been
performed, would have changed the result of the trial.

Jimenez has failed to

establish error in the summary dismissal of his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.
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2.

Jimenez Failed To Present An Issue Of Material Fact Entitling Him
To An Evidentiary Hearing On His Claim That Trial Counsel Was
Ineffective For Not Objecting To Blood Test Evidence

Jimenez alleged trial counsel was ineffective for
not object[ing] to or attempt[ing] in any way to exclude, blood test
evidence even when the witness testified she was not certified for
testing human blood, that the procedure she used was "a fairly new
test", that the test used was similar to a home pregnancy test, and
that the blood samples were never sent to a laboratory for further
analysis.
(R., Vol. 3, p.362, ,I9(c)(iii) (transcript citation omitted); see also R., Vol. 3, p.367,
,I18 (reiterating claim in affidavit).) The district court summarily dismissed this
claim, finding Jimenez failed to present any "authority or evidence that any
certification is required" for the testing performed in his case and also failed to
present anything "to support a conclusion that [the criminalist who tested the
blood] was unqualified to perform the tests . . . or that any objection to her
testimony would have been sustained." (R., Vol. 3, pp.479-80.)
Jimenez does not challenge the district court's stated basis for its ruling.
Instead, he argues the trial court erred in dismissing this claim because,
"[w]ithout the ability to tie the blood on Mr. Jimenez's shoes to Mr. Voshall,"
evidence that the stains on Jimenez's shoes tested positive for human blood was
both irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial.

(Appellant's brief, pp.17-18.)

This,

however, is not even remotely similar to the claim Jimenez alleged in his
amended post-conviction petition. (Compare id. with R., Vol. 3, p.363, ,T9(c)(iii),
and p. 367, ,T18.) Nor was it a claim ever argued to or decided by the district
court. (See generally, 12/9/11 Tr. (hearing on state's motion to dismiss amended
petition); R., Vol. 3, pp.451-84 (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
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dismissing amended petition).) Because Jimenez never alleged trial counsel
should have objected to the blood test evidence on the basis that it was
irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial, that claim is not properly before this Court on
appeal and this Court should not consider it.

State v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577,

579, 808 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1991); State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 181, 824 P.2d
109, 112 (1991); Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327,331,971 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Ct.
App. 1998); State v. Smith, 130 Idaho 450, 454, 942 P.2d 574, 578 (Ct. App.
1997). Moreover, because Jimenez does not challenge the court's determination
that Jimenez failed to make a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of
counsel for failing to object to the blood test evidence on the only grounds
asserted by Jimenez in his amended petition, the district court's order summarily
dismissing Jimenez's ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be affirmed on
this unchallenged basis. See, .sUL, State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366, 956
P.2d 1311, 1313 (Ct. App. 1998) (where a basis for a ruling by a district court is
unchallenged on appeal, appellate court will affirm on the unchallenged basis).

3.

Jimenez Failed To Present An Issue Of Material Fact Entitling Him
To An Evidentiary Hearing On His Claims That Trial Counsel Failed
To Provide Him An Adequate Opportunity To View The
Surveillance Video And Otherwise Failed To Adequately Prepare
Him For Cross-Examination

Jimenez alleged trial counsel was ineffective for not providing him an
adequate opportunity to view the video evidence before trial, contending counsel
"would only show [the] video on a laptop computer which was obscured by the
glass partition in the visiting room" and "did not let [Jimenez] review the DVD in a
separate attorney room where [he] could have been able to see the screen

20

better." (R., Vol. 3, p.362, ,I9(b)(iii), p.366, ,I12.) He also alleged counsel did not
prepare him for cross-examination, either by practicing any questioning or by
telling him what questions to expect on cross-examination. (R., Vol. 3, p.362,
,r9(c)(ii), p.366, ,r13.) As found by the district court, however, Jimenez did not
support these claims with any admissible evidence to demonstrate that counsel's
performance was either deficient or prejudicial.
Jimenez claimed that his vision was obscured and that he should have
been allowed to view the video in a "separate attorney room," but he failed to
present any evidence whatsoever that he told his attorney he was having
difficulty viewing the video or that his attorney could have secured a better
viewing facility. (See generally, R., Vol. 3, pp.360-68, 439-44.) He also failed to
allege with any specificity what counsel could have done to better prepare him
for the state's cross-examination or explain how he was prejudiced by counsel's
alleged failure to practice questioning with him. (See generally id.) As explained
by the district court in dismissing Jimenez's claims:
The scope of [Jimenez's] cross-examination was limited to the
events of the evening that [Jimenez] testified to on direct. [He] was
asked for details about the events of the evening that he had
testified about on direct examination. He was not asked any trick
questions nor was he pressed hard by the State on crossexamination. [Jimenez's] answers were evasive and he testified
that he did not know or did not remember quite a number of details
about his activities on the evening of the crime. ([Trial Tr.,] pp.45273.) [Jimenez] has presented no information as to how his counsel
could have improved his memory on such things as where they
went in Boise, their route of travel to the Maverick store or the
description of the house where a girl and her children joined them.
Considering the testimony presented, the Court could reasonabl[y]
infer that the jury could find [Jimenez] less than a credible witness.
. . . A defendant who chooses to testify opens himself to crossexamination within the scope of his testimony on direct
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examination. That scope of cross-examination was not exceeded
in this case.
(R., Vol. 3, pp.475-76.)
Jimenez does not challenge the court's factual findings, but argues those
"findings in essence establish why summarily dismissing Mr. Jimenez's claim
was in error." (Appellant's brief, p.19.) According to Jimenez, "[h]ad counsel met
with [him] to discuss his testimony and prepared him for the questions the
prosecutor might have asked," and also allowed him to "fully view" the
surveillance video, the events of the evening "would have been fresher in his
mind" and "his answers on cross examination would have seemed far less
'evasive."' (Id.) As he did below, however, Jimenez has still failed to articulate
how trial counsel was supposed to divine the questions the prosecutor ultimately
asked or what counsel could have done to improve Jimenez's memory of the
events of the evening in question. He has also failed to point to any evidence
that he ever told counsel he was not able to "fully view" the surveillance video or
that he asked counsel to show him the video in a "separate attorney room."
Having failed to do so, Jimenez has failed to show error in the summary
dismissal of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

4.

Jimenez Failed To Present An Issue Of Material Fact Entitling Him
To An Evidentiary Hearing On His Claim That Trial Counsel Was
Ineffective For Not Requesting An Instruction On The Lesser
Included Offense Of Simple Battery

Jimenez alleged trial counsel was ineffective for "not request[ing] a lesserincluded instruction or verdict form for Simple Battery."

(R., Vol. 3, p.362,

1[9(c)(iv); see also R., Vol. 3, p.367, ,T20 (trial counsel "did not ask the Court to
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instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of simple battery").) The district
court summarily dismissed this claim, ruling Jimenez failed to make a prima facie
showing that counsel's decision to not request such an instruction was anything
other than a matter of sound trial strategy. (R., Vol. 3, pp.476-78.) The court
also ruled Jimenez failed to make a prima facie showing of prejudice because
the jury, having found Jimenez guilty of aggravated battery, would never "have
had occasion to consider an included offense of battery." (R., Vol. 3, p.478.)
Contrary to Jimenez's assertions on appeal, a review of the record and the
applicable law supports the district court's rulings.
A trial court is only required to instruct the jury with respect to a lesser
included offense if: "(1) either party requests such an instruction; and (2) there is
a reasonable view of the evidence presented in the case that would support a
finding that the defendant committed such lesser included offense but did not
commit the greater offense." State v. Drennon, 126 Idaho 346, 352, 883 P.2d
704, 710 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing I.C. § 19-2132); State v. Croasdale, 120 Idaho
18, 19, 813 P.2d 357, 358 (Ct. App. 1991).

Trial counsel does not provide

ineffective assistance by choosing, as a tactical matter, to not request a
particular instruction, so long as such decision is not based on any objective
shortcoming such as inadequate preparation or ignorance of the law. Carsner v.
State, 132 Idaho 235, 970 P.2d 28 (Ct. App. 1999).
In this case there is no question that a reasonable view of the evidence
presented at trial would have supported the giving of a simple battery. As noted
by the district court, Jimenez "testified that he 'shoved' the victim but denied that
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he stabbed him." (R., p.477 (citing Trial Tr., p.448, Ls.10-25).) That trial counsel
failed to request a simple battery instruction does not by itself demonstrate any
deficiency in counsel's performance, however. Counsel was in the best position
to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the state's case and to make the
tactical decision whether to request an instruction on the lesser included offense
of simple battery or to not make such request with the goal of achieving an
outright acquittal. As found by the district court, Jimenez did not even allege,
much less present any evidence to demonstrate, that counsel's decision was
based on any objective shortcoming such as inadequate preparation or
ignorance of the law. (R., Vol. 3, p.478.) Having failed to do so, Jimenez failed
to make a prima facie showing of deficient performance.
Jimenez also failed to make a prima facie showing that he was prejudiced
by counsel's failure to request an instruction on the lesser included offense of
simple battery. Idaho law requires a trial court instructing a jury on a lesser
included offense to also "instruct the jury that it may not consider the lesser
included offense unless it has first considered each of the greater offenses within
which it is included, and has concluded in its deliberations that the defendant is
not guilty of each of such greater offense."

I.C. § 19-2132(c).

Because any

included offense instruction would have been accompanied by an acquittal first
instruction, the jury in Jimenez's case, having convicted on the charged offense,
would never have had occasion to consider the included offense of simple
battery. The district court thus correctly concluded that, even had a simple
battery instruction been requested and given, there was no reasonable possibility
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that the giving of such instruction would have altered the outcome of Jimenez's
trial. See State v. Joy._ P.3d _ , 2013 WL 3185264, **4-5 (Idaho, June 25,
2013) (and cases cited therein) (adopting "acquittal first" rule and holding "a
district court's failure to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses is harmless
error in cases where the jury has convicted the defendant of the greater
offense").

Jimenez has failed to show error in the summary dismissal of this

claim.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
orders denying Jimenez's motion for DNA testing and summarily dismissing his
petition for post-conviction relief.
th

DATED this 18 day of July 2013.

Deputy Attorney Getieral
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